After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its system of youth policy was ruined, while creating a new model proved to be a challenging task. The integration of youth policy into the emerging state institutions did not happen overnight: organizations were constantly formed and disbanded, the bodies responsible for policy implementation were frequently renamed, and their powers were continuously redefined. Developing a new approach to engaging with the younger generation required both time and significant financial resources — neither of which the state could afford in the early 1990s.
"Groza" provides a concise overview of how the system of "patriotic" education for young people has developed since 2000 and explores the potential future initiatives.
In 2000, Vladimir Putin became the President of Russia, marking the beginning of a period in which youth policy was conceptualised. During his first presidential term, key documents were introduced, laying the foundation for the creation of state-run youth organizations that would later take on the responsibility of “patriotically” educating young people.
During the early years of Putin's presidency, the key objective was to establish a regulatory framework that would enable the state to instill “spiritual and patriotic values, as well as a sense of loyalty to the constitutional and military duty” in young people. To this end, several important texts were adopted, including the Governmental decree "On Military-Patriotic Youth and Children’s Associations" and "Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation for years 2001-2005" program.
The “Youth of Russia” program, which had been introduced under President Boris Yeltsin, continued to operate, offering social benefits to young people, supporting youth entrepreneurship, and assisting young families. After the collapse of the USSR, the program prioritised creating a supportive environment for young people and establishing social protection systems. However, due to limited funding and the absence of a comprehensive legal framework, several aspects of the program were not fully implemented. On a positive note, the program did result in the organization of leisure activities for young people, such as providing funding for summer camp trips.
Following the “colour revolutions” within the post-Soviet space, it became evident that the state needed new and more effective ways to engage with young people. The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine served as stark examples of the strength of youth movements, prompting the government to recognise the need to safeguard the recently restored stability.
The conceptual framework developed by Putin's second term required a more advanced approach — the regulatory system needed to incorporate state institutions responsible for youth affairs. Responsibility for youth policy shifted among various government bodies: initially, the State Committee for Youth Affairs of the Russian Federation was established, later to be renamed the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodyozh), while its bodies under which it operated were to be changed over time.
Both The Young Guard of United Russia and Ours received support from the Kremlin, ensuring they had no funding issues. Their financial backing came from private businesses and Moscow city budget. Despite The Young Guard of United Russia’s charter requiring the organization to publish financial reports, none have been made available on its website.
From the very start, Ours and the Young Guard of United Russia have been seeing each other not as allies but rather as rivals, constantly competing for administrative resources. This rivalry became particularly evident in 2011, when a new nomination of a Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration led to a shift in favouritism from Ours to the Young Guard of United Russia, elevating it to one of the most influential pro-government youth organizations.
During Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs was established as the main body overseeing youth policy. This marked the final stage in the institutionalisation of state propaganda efforts aimed at young people. Initially, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs operated under the Ministry of Sport, Tourism and Youth Policy, but by 2018, it was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Russian government.
In 2008, Russia adopted the “Concept for the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020”, which for the first time recognised state youth policy as an independent area of governance. The Concept reinforced the existing approach: creating platforms for engagement with young people and establishing social mobility mechanisms to harness their potential “in the interests of the country’s innovative development”. In 2012, Dmitry Medvedev approved the “Concept for a Nationwide System for Identifying and Developing Young Talent”, further cementing this strategic direction.
Concurrently, the Young Guard of United Russia continued its recruitment efforts and promoted “its own” people into the highest echelons of power. “Youth Primaries-2011”, a reminder of the 2006 Political Workshop project, were launched, and in February 2012 the head of the Young Guard of United Russia, Timur Prokopenko, became deputy head of the Domestic Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration.
This way, students became the Young Guard of United Russia’s target audience.
The 2011-2012 protest movement, in which politically active youth played a significant role, forced the Russian authorities to rethink their approach to engaging with the younger generation. This shift was also influenced by new nominations within the government: Vyacheslav Volodin, who replaced Vladislav Surkov — the ideologist of the now-defunct Nashi movement which did not survive the Bolotnaya — as the head of the political bloc in the Presidential Administration, chose to build his own system of “patriotic education”.
The Young Guard of United Russia began to play an increasingly significant role in youth outreach, especially after the dissolution of Ours, which put an end to their competition. In March 2014, one of the Young Guard leaders, Sergey Pospelov, became the head of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, effectively merging party and state resources.
Fundamental changes in the system of “patriotic” education truly began only after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The sharp ideological shift implemented by the Russian authorities required a corresponding adjustment in youth policy.
This direction was formally institutionalized in November 2014, when the Russian government issued a decree approving the framework for youth policy up to 2025. Among its goals was stated the “formation of a national-state identity among young citizens”.
The militarisation of “patriotic” education was also evident in the creation of Young Army (Yunarmiya) — a movement established by the Russian Defense Ministry in 2015. It brought together all previously existing military-patriotic movements and became a foundation for “pre-conscription training”. Any child aged eight or older can join — as of December 2023, the number of participants has already exceeded 1.5 million. The values being instilled in Yunarmiya members are well illustrated by the movement's anthem:
To serve Russia is a destiny for you and me,
To serve Russia, a land so wondrous and free,
Where a new sun rises in the sky so blue.
Shoulder to shoulder, Russian troops march through,
Though the path of service may be hard and long,
With faith and loyalty to Russia we belong.
Since 2016, Sergey Kiriyenko replaced Vyacheslav Volodin as First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Kiriyenko adapted the system to fit his own approach. He promoted technocracy, which moved the emphasis from militarism to careerism. Under the sponsorship of the Kremlin's domestic policy curators, the number of professional and educational competitions and forums increased dramatically in the late 2010s. Formally non-governmental bodies like Knowledge (Znanie) Society and Russia — the Land of Opportunity NGO were used in addition to the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs to engage young people.
The most significant changes to youth policy occurred in 2022, when new implementation procedures and regulatory frameworks were put in place.
The foundation of a new “Pioneer” organization —The Movement of the First in July 2022 to centralise ideological work with children and teenagers — was one of the first steps in this direction. Additionally, since September 2022, schools have been holding “Conversations About Important Things”, a new weekly course where students study Russian history, discuss socio-political issues, and learn how to be “patriots”. A special “patriotic” course named “Foundations of Russian Statehood” was developed for university students.
The raise in funding “patriotic” education is the clearest indication of the Russian authorities' concern for youth policy. In the 2022 budget, the expenditure amount for this purpose was initially set at 5 billion rubles, but in the end, the government spent twice as much — 11,4 billion rubles. In 2024, it reached a record 45.85 billion rubles.
The government's youth propaganda strategy is currently set to run until 2030, with the goal of increasing the percentage of “patriotic” youth to 70%. The war against Ukraine has further shaped youth policy. In a speech to the State Council as early as 2022, Putin emphasized the value of youth volunteer movements. It is possible that the Movement of the First may no longer be enough to fulfill the state's patriotic agenda.
That same year, Dmitry Artyukhov, chairman of the State Council Commission on Youth Policy, proposed a national project to consolidate all youth initiatives and support programs under a unified framework.
